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Preface & Acknowledgements  
During his internship with the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy in June 
2010, U.S. Air Force Academy Cadet Chase Lane surveyed the activities of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Acquisition Research Program in its first seven years.  The sheer 
volume of research products—almost 600 published papers (e.g., technical reports, journal 
articles, theses)—indicates the extent to which the depth and breadth of acquisition 
research has increased during these years.  Over 300 authors contributed to these works, 
which means that the pool of those who have had significant intellectual engagement with 
acquisition issues has increased substantially.  The broad range of research topics includes 
acquisition reform, defense industry, fielding, contracting, interoperability, organizational 
behavior, risk management, cost estimating, and many others.  Approaches range from 
conceptual and exploratory studies to develop propositions about various aspects of 
acquisition, to applied and statistical analyses to test specific hypotheses.  Methodologies 
include case studies, modeling, surveys, and experiments.  On the whole, such findings 
make us both grateful for the ARP’s progress to date, and hopeful that this progress in 
research will lead to substantive improvements in the DoD’s acquisition outcomes. 
As pragmatists, we of course recognize that such change can only occur to the 
extent that the potential knowledge wrapped up in these products is put to use and tested to 
determine its value.  We take seriously the pernicious effects of the so-called “theory–
practice” gap, which would separate the acquisition scholar from the acquisition practitioner, 
and relegate the scholar’s work to mere academic “shelfware.”  Some design features of our 
program that we believe help avoid these effects include the following: connecting 
researchers with practitioners on specific projects; requiring researchers to brief sponsors on 
project findings as a condition of funding award; “pushing” potentially high-impact research 
reports (e.g., via overnight shipping) to selected practitioners and policy-makers; and most 
notably, sponsoring this symposium, which we craft intentionally as an opportunity for 
fruitful, lasting connections between scholars and practitioners. 
A former Defense Acquisition Executive, responding to a comment that academic 
research was not generally useful in acquisition practice, opined, “That’s not their [the 
academics’] problem—it’s ours [the practitioners’].  They can only perform research; it’s up 
to us to use it.”  While we certainly agree with this sentiment, we also recognize that any 
research, however theoretical, must point to some termination in action; academics have a 
responsibility to make their work intelligible to practitioners.  Thus we continue to seek 
projects that both comport with solid standards of scholarship, and address relevant 
acquisition issues.  These years of experience have shown us the difficulty in attempting to 
balance these two objectives, but we are convinced that the attempt is absolutely essential if 
any real improvement is to be realized. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
• Program Manager, Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System 
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• Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & Technology) 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics Management) 
• Director, Strategic Systems Programs Office 
• Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, US Army 
• Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive, Business Transformation Agency  
• Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department of 
Energy 
 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this Symposium.  
 
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 
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RADM Lenn Vincent—Industry Chair, Defense Acquisition University (DAU). An independent 
consultant, RADM Vincent uses his defense and industry experience, expertise, and perspective to 
advise the DAU management team, OSD, the uniformed services, and industry on matters relative to 
contracting, program management, logistics, and supply chain management. As a professor at the 
DAU, he presents views to foster a more viable and effective defense acquisition management 
system. An international educator, consultant, dynamic speaker, and respected government and 
industry leader, he has taught and/or consulted in contract management, capture management, 
project management, supply chain management, and leadership. 
As a vice president at American Management Systems and CACI International, RADM Vincent was 
responsible for working with senior Department of Defense and industry leaders to build long-term 
business relationships and to help identify solutions to acquisition, logistics, and financial 
management challenges. His strategic focus was an initiative to create an integrated digital 
environment that would extend the DoD’s automated procurement systems into industry and into the 
DoD program management offices, in addition to implementation and training strategies for new 
products and service. 
Prior to entering civilian life, RADM Vincent completed a distinguished career in the United States 
Navy, serving at both sea and ashore. He has over 30 years of broad based and in-depth leadership 
and management experience in acquisition, supply chain management, logistics, and financial 
management. 
RADM Vincent holds a master’s in Business Administration from George Washington University. He 
also is a Certified Navy Material and Acquisition Professional, and is DAWIA Level III certified in both 
Contracting and Logistics. 
He is past-president of the National Contract Management Association and served on its board of 
directors as well as the following boards: Navy League National Capital Council; NDIA Washington 








Why Didn't the DoD Defend Their FDO’s Listed in GAO Report 
06-66? 
James Gill [james.gill@losangeles.af.mil] 
Abstract 
In December of 2005, the Government Accountability Office released a report 
entitled DOD Has Paid Billions in Award and Incentive Fees Regardless of Acquisition 
Outcomes.  The report was an indictment of the manner in which the DoD executed 
contracts—especially award fee contracts—and the fee determining officials who were 
charged with assessing contractor performance and rewarding that performance with their 
subjective evaluation of that performance. The GAO was asked to determine whether award 
and incentive fees have been used effectively as a tool for achieving the DoD’s desired 
outcomes. In order to do this, they reviewed a number of major programs and came to the 
conclusion that award fees were generally not linked to acquisition outcomes.  However, 
many PMs are of an opinion that award fees are an effective tool in communicating the 
government’s expectations and influencing contractor behavior in a positive manner.  This 
paper analyzes the GAO’s report and explains why there was such a disconnect between 
the GAO and DoD Program Managers. 
Report Summary 
In December of 2005, the Government Accountability Office released a report 
entitled DOD Has Paid Billions in Award and Incentive Fees Regardless of Acquisition 
Outcomes.  The report was an indictment of the manner in which the DoD executed 
contracts—especially award fee contracts—and the fee determining officials who were 
charged with assessing contractor performance and rewarding that performance with their 
subjective evaluation of that performance. 
The GAO was asked to determine whether award and incentive fees have been used 
effectively as a tool for achieving the DoD’s desired outcomes. In order to do this, they 
reviewed a number of major programs and came to the conclusion that award fees were 
generally not linked to acquisition outcomes. 
It is my belief, based upon discussing this matter with a number of Program 
Managers (PMs) that were involved with several of the programs that were reviewed by the 
GAO, that many PMs are of an opinion that award fees are an effective tool in 
communicating the government’s expectations and influencing contractor behavior in a 
positive manner. 
Why was there such a disconnect between the GAO and DoD Program Managers?  
To some degree, it is due to the way that success is measured by the parties.  The GAO, 
along with many in Congress and in DoD leadership positions, considers success to be 
measured in terms of cost, schedule, and performance. In this vein, most major defense 
programs are significantly unsuccessful. Many, if not most, of these programs experience 
schedule slippage along with major cost growth and, while explainable, paint a picture of a 
process that does not effectively reward or punish these results. 
The Program Managers understand that cost growth and schedule delays are often a 
fact of life in the realm that they occupy. Much of these factors are influenced by the 
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government’s behavior and are not attributable to contractor failures. Funding turbulence, 
requirements creep, and technical problems created by state-of-the-art technical challenges 
are but a few of the reasons why a program may get into trouble. 
In some cases, the contractor is put into a bind in trying to work through the known-
unknown and unknown-unknown problems that surface during any major systems 
development. This does not excuse contractor failures but may mitigate some of the 
perceptions of failure that are visible only to those closely working with the program itself. 
Another aspect of the disconnect centers upon the government Program Managers’ 
overriding focus on mission assurance, the need to support the warfighter, and the 
recognition that while cost and schedule are important, the fact that a program overruns or 
comes in behind schedule is less important than that the systems work, and meet or exceed 
the customer’s needs. The ultimate proof of whether a program is successful or not will 
eventually come down to the question as to whether it meets customers’ expectations or 
not.  If it eventually exceeds expectations, many will forget that it ran over budget, or that it 
was late in being fielded. 
An example of this reality may be seen in the GPS program. When the program went 
through initial development, it ran over budget and experienced many delays.  There was 
doubt as to whether it was technically possible to build, and more doubt as to whether it 
would be of use to the warfighter. The ultimate implementation of the GPS system shows 
that those initial concerns have been forgotten as the system has worked its way into many 
aspects of daily life. There are many acquisition professionals who believe that many of the 
current systems will be viewed in a similar manner once they have been fielded and the 
results realized by their customers. 
The GAO was focused upon cost and schedule in assessing the relative success of 
the programs that they reviewed and, as a result, came to the conclusion that the fees paid 
to the contractors did not improve contractor performance and acquisition outcomes.  Their 
focus upon acquisition outcomes indicated that the DoD was awarding too many fees for too 
little performance. 
The report listed seven actions that the DoD should take to improve its use of award 
fees on all new contracts.  These were (1) instructing the military services to move toward 
more outcome-based award fee criteria that are both achievable and promote accountability 
for acquisition outcomes; (2) ensuring that award fee structures are motivating excellent 
performance by only paying for above-satisfactory performance; and (3) requiring the 
appropriate approving officials to review new contracts to make sure that these actions are 
being taken.  The DoD can improve its use of award fees on all existing contracts by (4) 
issuing DoD guidance on when rollover is appropriate. In the longer term, the DoD can 
improve its use of award and incentive fees by (5) developing a mechanism for capturing 
award and incentive fee data within existing data systems, such as the Defense Acquisition 
Management Information Retrieval system; (6) developing performance measures to 
evaluate the effectiveness of award and incentive fees as a tool for improving contractor 
performance and achieving desired program outcomes; and (7) developing a mechanism to 
share proven incentive strategies for the acquisition of different types of products and 
services with contracting and program officials across the DoD. 
These recommendations were relatively benign, although the implications throughout 
the report were clear: the DoD paid fees that were clearly too much for the work that was 
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being performed. It did not directly accuse FDOs of incompetence, but the implications were 
clear: they were not doing their job properly and needed additional training and oversight. 
Another element of the report that was troubling and perhaps an indicator that the 
GAO did not understand the distinction between a contract where the award fee represented 
an add-on or bonus and one that represented the entire available fee for performance on the 
contract. To insist that the fee would only be paid for above-satisfactory performance 
indicates a lack of understanding as to the right of a contractor to receive fee for meeting the 
basic requirements of the contract. It is more correct to criticize the report for expecting a 
contractor to do more than what is on the contract—in earlier times, this would have been 
portrayed as “gold-plating.” Clearly, this is something to be discouraged during the difficult 
fiscal uncertainties that we see today. 
So what did the DoD do with this report? From the perspective of the Program Office, 
it seemed that the leadership accepted the findings and began to issue policies that 
reflected concerns with the manner in which award fees had been implemented. The only 
reasonable explanation for this revised policy would be that the Services did not write their 
plans to be based upon acquisition outcomes, or that the FDOs charged with implementing 
the plans were either incompetent or negligent in their decision-making process. 
I do not believe that either was the case, but rather that the senior leadership chose 
the more expedient approach to reduce, if not eliminate, the use of award fee contracts. In 
today’s environment, it is difficult, if not impossible, to get an approval for the use of a CPAF 
type of contract.  It is currently possible to use an award fee as an add-on incentive to a 
CPIF or FPIF arrangement, but under this structure, the primary incentive is not the award 
fee. 
In the Air Force, there is a legacy of award fee contracting that has been in place 
since the 1980s.  To a certain degree, there is an association with Ms. Darleen Druyun and 
award fee contracting.  During the period that she was the principal deputy for acquisition, it 
was almost impossible to get an acquisition plan approved without an award fee associated 
with the contract strategy. She believed, as did a generation of acquisition professionals that 
followed her, that award fees were invaluable in motivating contractors to perform as 
directed by government leadership—most notably, the FDO. Ms. Druyun’s involvement with 
the Tanker issues has contributed to her and her policies being exiled from any Air Force 
acquisition planning structure. 
The bottom line with regard to the matter of award fee contracting is that a valuable 
tool has been taken from the Program Manager’s kit. Most would like to use the award fee 
process to enhance discussions and improve communication between the Program Office 
and the contractors performing the work. Award fees often provide instant feedback to the 
contractor’s leadership as to how they are performing.  Since many of the contractor PMs 
have their annual bonus tied to the rating that is given, they do pay attention to FDO 
feedback. Contractors like the opportunity to receive regular fee payments and government 
program people like to have an element of leverage over contractor performance. 
An additional result of this report is the elimination of the use of “rollover” in award 
fee contracting. This practice allows for unearned fees to be “rolled over” and made 
available in subsequent periods from that in which it was not earned—a second bite of the 
apple.  It was a favorite practice of Program Managers and is often used by Prime 
Contractors in their contract with their subcontractors. The use of rollover has been 
prohibited in a recent FAR directive. 
 =
=




In the Space business, many of our programs have moved from development to 
production, and there is little need in most cases for CPAF production contracts. 
Consequently, most new contracts will not have award fees, or award fees will not be the 
primary incentive on the contract.  In the production environment, there is little need for 
more than the contract requirement: build the item as designed, do it on schedule, and do it 
for a reasonable price. 
As we move into the next cycle of development, there will be little expectation that 
award fee contracts will be used.  Some organizations will not miss them, but those that 
seek to push technology past the current state of the art will miss the opportunity that they 
present to enhance communication and encourage a willingness to support the needs of the 
Program Manager. 
Disclaimer 
The opinions in this paper are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the opinion 
of the Air Force. 
